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A recent string of theoretical papers highlights the importance of geographical distance in explaining pricing and 
availability of loans to small firms.  Lenders located in the vicinity of small firms have significantly lower 
monitoring and transaction costs, and hence considerable market power if competing financiers are located 
relatively far.  We directly study the effect on loan conditions of the geographical distance between firms, the 
lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity.  For our study, we employ detailed contract information from 
more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms and control for relevant relationship, loan contract, bank branch, 
firm, and regional characteristics.  We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price 
discrimination in bank lending.  Loan rates decrease in the distance between the firm and the lending bank and 
increase similarly in the distance between the firm and competing banks.  Both effects are statistically significant 
and economically relevant, are robust to changes in model specifications and variable definitions, and are 
seemingly not driven by the modest changes over time in lending technology we infer. 
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 1.  Introduction 
Banks derive market power ex post from private information they obtain about firms during the course of the 
lending relationship or ex ante from their relative physical proximity to the borrowing firms.  Closer banks 
enjoy significantly lower costs of monitoring and transacting with small firms, such that “if other banks are 
relatively far, close banks have considerable market power” (Petersen and Rajan (1995), p. 417). 
We directly study the effect on loan conditions of the geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, 
and all other banks in the vicinity, controlling for relevant relationship, loan, bank branch, firm, and regional 
characteristics.  For our study, we employ a unique data set containing detailed loan contract information 
(including firm and lender identities and addresses) from more than 15,000 bank loans to (predominantly) 
small firms as well as information on competing bank branches in the vicinity of the firm. 
We find that, in line with predictions emanating from theory modeling spatial price discrimination, borrowing 
costs decrease in the distance between the firm and the lending bank.  We identify banking competition and 
pricing strategies in our analysis by including both the number of bank branches (or branch concentration) 
and the distance between the borrower and competing bank branches in the vicinity.  We observe that 
increasing distance between the borrower and alternative lenders significantly relaxes price competition and 
results in substantially higher borrowing costs for the firm. 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2001b) also study the 
correspondence between distance and lending conditions.  Petersen and Rajan (2002) focus on the increasing 
distance and changing modes of communication between small firms and their lenders in the United States 
over the last 25 years.  Berger et al. (2001b) document how large banks lend at a greater distance than small 
banks in the U.S.  In contrast, we analyze contract terms of loans granted by a single bank and incorporate not 
only the distance between the borrowing firm and this lender, but also the distance between the firm and the 
competing banks in the vicinity to identify the presence of spatial price discrimination.  We further document 
that the distance between the European firms and the bank in our study did not increase substantially over the 
period 1975-1997. 
Other empirical work reveals the impact of geographical distance on related activities of financial 
intermediaries, such as for example, cross-border bank lending and branching (Berger, Dai, Ongena and 
Smith (2001a); Buch (2001); Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1996); Grosse and Goldberg (1991)).  Distance 
may also determine the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms within bank holding companies (Berger 
and DeYoung (2001)), the strength of informational contagion between banks (Aharony and Swary (1996)), 
and the representation of venture capitalists on the boards of U.S. private firms (Lerner (1995)). 
Physical distance may further influence activities on financial markets in general.  International capital flows 
seem bound by geographical proximity (Portes and Rey (2001)), but so is possibly the composition and 
returns on actively managed U.S. mutual funds (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), the trading profitability of 
traders on the German electronic exchange Xetra (Hau (2001)) and the portfolio choices of Finnish investors 
(Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)).  We contribute to this growing literature by analyzing the impact of both 
the distances between lender-borrower and competing banks-borrower on the pricing of bank loans to bank-
dependent small firms. 
We organize the rest of the paper as follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature on distance, lending 
relationships, and competition.  Section 3 introduces the data and discusses the methodology used in our 
paper.  Section 4 displays and discusses the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1.  Distance 
Recent theoretical papers highlight the importance of distance in explaining the availability and pricing of 
bank loans.  Lending conditions may depend on the distance between the borrower and the lender and the 
distance between the borrower and the closest competing bank (Table 1 summarizes the theoretical 
predictions). 
In traditional location differentiation models (Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979)), borrowers incur transportation 
costs visiting their bank branch.
1  Total transportation costs naturally increase in distance.  Banks price 
uniformly if they cannot observe borrower location or are prohibited to charge different prices to different 
borrowers.  Borrowers pay the same interest rate but incur different transportation costs depending on their 
location vis-à-vis the lending bank. 
However, if banks can observe the borrowers' location and offer interest rates based on that information, they 




charge a higher interest rate to those borrowers located closest to its branch (see for example, Lederer and 
Hurter (1986)).  Hence, discriminatory pricing based on transportation costs implies, for a given number of 
banks, a negative relationship between the loan rate and the borrower-lender distance and a similar, positive 
relationship between the loan rate and the distance between the borrower and the closest competing bank. 
The cost of servicing a borrower could also be related to physical distance.  For example, bank costs increase 
in borrower-lender distance, because of extra communication costs or transportation costs incurred by banks 
visiting the borrowers' premises.  Loan rates passing through such costs will increase in distance.  However, 
monitoring costs increasing in distance may also give rise to discriminatory pricing.  For example, in 
Sussman and Zeira (1995) spatial price discrimination arises because all banks face monitoring costs 
increasing in distance, have a strong bargaining position, and extract all the gains of trade.  Discrimination 
again implies a negative (positive) relationship between the loan rate and the borrower-lender (borrower-
closest competing bank) distance (for a given number of banks).  The correspondence between borrower-
lender distance and loan rate becomes non-monotonic if monitoring costs are also dependent on loan size 
(Wong and Chan (1993)). 
2.2.  Distance and Lender Information 
Lenders may initially be unsure about the exact location of the borrower.  For example, if the borrower 
maintains multiple centers of activity, it is not clear at first for the bank where to monitor.  In that case, the 
bank can only engage in discriminatory pricing upon becoming informed about the location and 
transportation costs faced by their borrowers.  In Dell'Ariccia (2001), for example, banks become informed 
about the location of the borrower through first period lending.  In his model, only "relationship" banks, 
lending in their second period, can engage in spatial price discrimination, while de novo "transactional" banks 
have to resort to “mill pricing”. 
The severity of the asymmetric information problem itself may also increase in distance.  Hauswald and 
Marquez (2000) develop a model in which the precision of the signal about a borrower’s quality received by 
a bank decreases in distance.  Because banks will receive more precise signals about close borrowers, 
competing banks will face increasing adverse selection problems when approaching borrowers closer to the 
most informed bank.  Hence, the informed relationship bank can charge higher interest rates to closer 
borrowers while the uninformed transactional banks will charge higher interest rates to borrowers located 
farther afield due to the increase in the adverse selection problem.  Ceteris paribus, Hauswald and Marquez 
(2000) derive a negative (positive) relationship between the loan rate and the distance between the borrower 
and the relationship (transactional) bank. 
2.3.  Competition 
The number of banks in the market is inversely related to the distance between the lender and the (closest) 
competing banks.  An increase in the number of banks leads to more competition and possibly lowers the 
loan rates.  For example, a decrease in the fixed setup costs per bank in Sussman and Zeira (1995) and 
Harrison, Sussman and Zeira (1999) increases the number of banks, decreases the distance between any two 
neighboring banks, and decreases the loan rate for each bank-borrower distance combination.
2 
On the other hand, competition between more banks aggravates an adverse selection problem by enabling 
lower quality borrowers to obtain financing, resulting in moral hazard and credit rationing (Petersen and 
Rajan (1995)) or a higher interest rate (Broecker (1990), Cao and Shi (2001)).  In Dell'Ariccia (2001), 
adverse selection generates an endogenous fixed cost constituting a barrier to entry in the industry limiting 
the number of banks competing in the market. 
A decrease in the fixed cost component of the relationship building technology in Hauswald and Marquez 
(2000) similarly not only leads to an increase in the number of banks and more competition, but also results 
in a retrenchment towards relationship lending.
3  The lower entry barrier then leads to sharper adverse 
selection problems and higher loan rates for the borrowers closest to the relationship lender but lower loan 
rates for customers farther away.  In effect, loan rates will decrease (increase) more per unit in distance 
between the borrower and the relationship (transactional) bank. 
2.4.  Distance, Borrower Information, and Experience 
Borrowers may not be fully informed about the precise location of all the competitors’ branches and the 
availability and conditions of the loans offered there.  For example, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Bester 
and Petrakis (1995) model such location cum informational differentiation.  In Grossman and Shapiro (1984), 




The advertising itself is not localized.  The sales price in their model exceeds the full information price, by 
the magnitude of the transportation cost, as informational differentiation lowers the elasticity of demand.  In 
addition, consumers in their model, as they are unaware of all sellers, not necessarily patronize the closest 
one. 
Bester and Petrakis (1995) model the advertising of lower price offers.  Absent advertising, customers are 
only informed about “local” prices.  They show that firms will advertise lower prices to attract customers 
from distant locations.  Hence, more distant and informed customers will be observed to receive lower prices. 
However, it should be noted that the location of the bank branch is just one out of many characteristics of a 
banking product that are important for the borrowers.  Consequently, borrowers not always visit the bank 
branch located closest when another bank’s product exhibits other, more preferred, characteristics.
4  And, 
once borrowers have experienced a good match and observed the high quality of the services provided by 
their current bank, they will only switch to another bank branch when offered a considerably lower price 
(Tirole (1988), p. 294). 
To conclude, most theoretical models imply a negative (positive) correspondence between the borrower-
lender (competing bank) distance and the loan rate, but information availability, experience, and other 
product characteristics may abate the strength of the distance – loan rate relationship.  However, as far as we 
are aware no paper has yet empirically investigated these associations, or lack thereof, directly and 
comprehensively. 
3.  Data 
3.1.  Loan Contracts 
We extend a data set detailed in Degryse and Van Cayseele (1998) and employed by Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000).  The original data set consists of 17,776 loans given to independents (or single-person 
businesses),
5 and small, medium, and large sized firms by an important Belgian bank which operates all over 
Belgium.  Around 80% of the firms are single-person businesses (sole proprietorships).  Some borrowers take 
several loans from this bank; the data set covers loans granted to 13,104 borrowers — implying that the 
average borrower maintained 1.36 loans at that bank.  The sample commences with all existing loans at the 
bank as of August 10, 1997 that were initiated after January 1, 1995.
6 
For each borrower we calculate the distance to both the lending bank and the branches of all other, competing 
banks located in the same postal zone as the borrower.  As of December 31
st, 1994, we identify 7,477 
branches,
7 operated by 145 different banks and located in 837 different postal zones (Table 2).  Each postal 
zone carries a postal code between 1,000 and 9,999.  The first digit in the code indicates a geographical area, 
we call “postal area”, which in most cases coincides with one of the ten Provinces in Belgium.  A postal zone 
covers on average 36 sq km,
8 and contains approximately nine bank branches.  Not surprisingly borrowers 
are often located in more densely banked areas, with on average more than 17 bank branches per postal zone, 
resulting in around 250,000 possible borrower – bank branch pairs. 
We employ both web-based MapBlast.com and PC-based MS Mappoint to track the shortest traveling time 
(in minutes) by car between the borrower and each bank branch.  We choose the shortest traveling time, the 
default setting in both programs, over a number of other mapping alternatives,
9 as we suspect that for most 
entrepreneurs in our sample variable transportation costs consists mainly out of traveling time spent.  We 
provide concrete statistics on this issue when we discuss the results and employ the fastest driving distance 
(in kilometers) in robustness exercises. 
Address recording errors, incomplete map coverage, and changes in street names (we have 1995 addresses 
but the software is using up-to-date maps) cut in our sample.  We drop 801 contracts that were either 
relocated or where the borrower switched to another or a new branch after the closure of their old one.  Next, 
we conservatively remove the 1-% borrowers located farthest from their lending bank, as we discover that a 
combination of address-recording errors,
10 mapping problems,
11 and non-standard borrowing motives and 
business arrangements
12 is responsible for most of these longer distances.  Finally, we lay aside 612 contracts 
located in postal zones without competing banks.  We return to this set of contracts later in the paper. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the remaining 15,044 contracts.
13  Table 3 shows the definition, 
mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of our variables, broken down into seven sets of 
characteristics: geographical distances, relationship characteristics, competition measures, loan rate and size, 




3.2.  Distance to Lender 
The median borrower is located around 4 minutes and 20 seconds from the lender, which depending on the 
local road conditions translates into 2.25 kilometers (1.40 miles) of driving at 31 km/h (20 mph).
14  In 
contrast, Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that the median distance between lending banks and small US firms 
covered by the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) is more than double, i.e. 4 miles.  
However, the median firm in the NSSBF employs 2 to 4 employees,
15 while the median firm in our sample is 
a sole proprietorship.
16  In addition, costs of driving may differ substantially between Belgium and the U.S.,
17 
and Belgian businesses may be limited by the size of the country in their choice of domestically located 
banks.
18  These arguments may also explain the even larger differences with the other distance statistics 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) report.  For example, the average (75 percentile) borrower – bank distance in our 
sample is around 3 (3.5) miles, while the same borrower in Petersen and Rajan (2002) communicates across 
42.5 (14) miles with her bank,
19 or across a whopping 252 (255) miles with her other financial institutions. 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) also report that the distance between U.S. borrowers and banks has increased 
dramatically over time.
20  For example, the median bank-borrower distance has more than doubled between 
the mid-70s and the early-90s from 2 to 5 miles, while the average distance more than quadrupled from 16 to 
68 miles.  In contrast, in our sample, the median and average distances between the borrowers and the 
Belgian bank we study increased by only around 30%, from 4 (6.85) in 1975 to 5.2 (8.86) minutes in 1997.
21 
In Figure 1, we display the traveling time statistics for each year, which is calculated by subtracting the 
duration of the relationship between lender and borrower from the initiation year of each loan contract.  In 
effect, we assume that the address of the borrower didn’t change during the relationship period.  The 
horizontal scale of the figure lists the year and the resulting number of contracts in each year.  The right scale 
reports the means (dots) plus or minus two standard deviations (thin vertical lines) of the traveling times in 
minutes. 
Most of the modest increase in traveling time in our sample seems to occur during the early-90s.  This 
increase may be partly driven by the changes in the number of bank branches because of regulatory driven 
de-specialization of financial intermediation and resulting consolidation.  Indeed, Figure 1 (left scale) 
illustrates the small decrease in the number of branches of all banks during the same period.
22 
We regress the Distance to Lender on an intercept, the Starting Year of the Relationship, a Large Firm 
dummy, and an interaction term between the latter two variables.  We want to investigate whether technology 
affects larger firms in a different way than other firms.  Distance grows significantly, but only by around 9 
seconds per year, while the growth in distance between large firms and their lenders is indistinguishable from 
the growth in distance between small firms and their lenders.  When we add the (national) number of bank 
branches to this specification, the growth in distance drops to a significant but small 4 seconds per year.  The 
closure of one branch in each postal zone (implying a decrease in the number of bank branches about equal 
the observed drop between 1990 and 1997) increases the traveling time by around 1 minute and 40 seconds. 
Possible selection issues may further complicate the assessment of this moderate growth in distance between 
bank and borrowers (Petersen and Rajan (2002)).  For example, firms may be poached, and hence may switch 
banks, more frequently if they are located farther away from a bank branch.
23  And, if we look at the 
evolution of distance by loan origination date, we find that average distance actually decreases from 7.7 
minutes in 1995 to 6.68 minutes in 1997!  We are therefore tempted to conclude that our findings with 
respect to the evolution over time of the lender-borrower distances match a study by Buch (2001).
24  She 
reports that in the period 1983 through 1998 distance became less important for international bank lending by 
U.S. banks, in stark contrast to European banks for which distance remained of the same importance.  We 
will nevertheless control for possible changes over time in lending technology in robustness exercises. 
3.3.  Distance to Closest Competitors 
We now turn to our other main variable of interest, distance to the closest competitors.  The median (average) 
borrower in our sample is located 2 (2) minutes from the closest competitor or 3 minutes and 15 (50) seconds 
from the quartile closest competitor located in the same postal zone.  The quartile closest competitor is the 
bank branch with the 25-percentile traveling time located in the same postal zone as the borrower.  We select 
this second measure as our metric of competitor proximity for obvious measurement reasons.  Omissions, 
recording, or mapping errors are less likely to influence the 25-percentile statistic than the shortest distance 
statistic.  In addition, bank branches may not be entirely homogeneous in their product offerings.  In that case, 
we also conjecture our 25% measure to be more highly correlated with the distance to the closest, “truly” 
competing bank branch than the minimum distance metric.  In any case, we will also check for robustness of 




The lending bank is located closer than the quartile (closest) competitor in more than 44% (25%) of the 
borrower contract cases making distance a relevant bank (product) characteristic for a sizeable minority of the 
borrowers in our data set.  A majority of the borrowers though doesn’t seem overly constrained by 
geographical proximity.
25  Hence, our statistics suggest that, while distance is important, information, 
reputation, and other bank characteristics may also determine the choice of lender and the resulting loan 
conditions. 
3.4.  Relationship Characteristics 
Relationship characteristics are therefore central to our analysis in capturing information and experience 
effects.  The first characteristic in this category, Main Bank, indicates whether this bank considers itself as the 
main-bank of that firm or not.  The definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main-bank is 
“having a monthly ‘turnover’ on the current account of at least BEF 100,000 (U.S. Dollar 2,500),
26 and 
buying at least two products from that bank”.  More than half of all borrowers are classified as Main Bank 
customers.  Main Bank captures the scope of the relationship.  That is whether this firm also buys other 
products from this bank and executes most of its payments via this bank.  If these sources of information 
improve the accuracy of the bank’s information or reduce the monitoring costs, the measure Main Bank 
should reduce the expected cost of such loans.
27  But Main Bank also proxies for the lack of information a 
borrower has about alternatives.  In that case, a main bank customer will pay a higher loan rate, but may be 
less subject to spatial price discrimination. 
The second relationship variable is the Duration of the financial Relationship in years with that particular 
bank at the time the loan rate is decided upon.  A relationship starts when a firm buys for the first time a 
product from that bank.  The average duration of the relationship in the sample is about eight years.  Duration 
proxies for the increased time for a firm to experience the banks’ products and appreciate the added flexibility 
the bank has to maintain and fulfill implicit contracts.  While the bank gains private information about a firm 
and tailors its products, the firm may also become locked-in.  Hence, a long-term bank customer may pay a 
higher loan rate, but become less subject to discriminatory pricing. 
3.5.  Competition 
Finally, we also enlist in our main analysis the Number of Competitors, which is defined as the number of 
bank branches (minus the lender’s) in the borrower’s postal zone.  In most of the discussed spatial models, 
the number of competitors corresponds inversely to the sum of the distance to the lender and the closest 
competitor.  This is also the case in our sample, though the correlation coefficient seems small in absolute 
value.  The correlation coefficient for the Number of Competitors and the sum of the Distance to Lender and 
Distance to the quartile (actual) Closest Competitor for each contract is only –0.023*** (–0.103***). 
An obvious candidate to explain the small correlation coefficient is the spatial simplification embedded in the 
theoretical models discussed earlier in the paper.  Geographical clustering of business and banking activities 
across a land surface may weaken any correspondence between distance and the number of bank branches.  
In addition, there are also the differences in surface size of the postal zones.  Many postal zones are roughly 
equal in size, a cursory look on the map suggests.  However, there are exceptions such as the postal zones in 
the Capital Brussels (which are small) and the postal zones in the provinces Luxembourg or West-Flanders 
(which are large).  Such differences are most likely related to differences in for example population density, 
the number of businesses, and other possible criteria the postal system used to zone the country.  We include 
8 postal area dummies (which cover around 100 zones each) in addition to the base case to control for these 
differences in zone size.  We will also introduce postal zone and bank branch effects in robustness exercises. 
3.6.  Other Variables 
The rest of the variables are also discussed at length in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), so we limit the 
write-up here.  Consider the loan contract characteristics.  The first is the Interest Rate on the loan until the 
next revision.  For fixed interest rate loans, this is the yield to maturity of the loan.  For variable interest rate 
loans, this is the interest rate until the date at which the interest rate will be revised as stipulated in the 
contract.  The average interest rate on a loan in our sample is 8.12% or 812 basis points (we will employ basis 
points throughout the paper to facilitate the tabulation and interpretation of the results).  The variable rate 
loans are, after an interest rate revision, treated in the sample as a new observation, with a revised interest 
rate.  Loan fees are not included, but are typically not charged to sole proprietorships, set nationally and 
unlikely to be determined by any of the local variables of interest. 




assume in our empirical analysis that loan rate and size are determined jointly.  The variable Collateral 
indicates whether the loan is collateralized or not.  We have no further information on the type of collateral 
provided.  Approximately 26% of the loans are collateralized.  We will assume, as in for example Berger and 
Udell (1995), Harhoff and Körting (1998), and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) among others, that collateral and 
interest rate conditions are determined sequentially, with the collateral decision preceding the interest rate 
determination.  Indeed, collateral is often pledged at the beginning of a relationship, possibly infrequently 
and/or inconsistently adjusted, and may end up covering multiple loans.  However, we will investigate 
alternative decision sequences with respect to loan size and collateral in robustness checks. 
Another loan contract characteristic is the Repayment Duration of the Loan.  For all loans to the firms, we 
know at what ‘speed’ the loans are repaid.  This allows us to compute the exact repayment duration of a loan.  
We include the natural logarithm of this variable in the regression analysis in order to proxy for the risk 
associated with the time until the loan is repaid.  We also include dummies capturing the type of loan the firm 
is taking.  We have five types of loans in our sample.  For bank-strategic considerations, we cannot reveal the 
relative importance of the types of loans.  We include the types of loans in Table 3 for convenient reference, 
but cannot report statistics.  The distinction is made between Business Mortgage, Bridging Finance, Prepay 
Taxes, Business Term, and Consumer Credit loans.  The size of most loans is rather small, since a large part 
of our loans are of the Prepay Taxes and Consumer Credit type.  We also include a Rollover dummy, which 
takes a value of one if the loan is given to prepay another loan, and is zero otherwise.  Four dummies capture 
the effect of the revisability of the loan. 
The firm characteristics include both proxies for the size and legal form of the firm.  We distinguish between 
Sole Proprietorships (82.99% of the sample), Small (15.98%), Medium (0.89%), and Large (0.14%) Firms, 
and between Sole Proprietorships, Limited Partnerships (11.97%), Limited Partnerships with Equal Sharing 
(1.17%), Corporations (3.78%), and temporary Bridge Arrangements (0.09%).  In the regressions, we exclude 
the dummy for Sole Proprietorships.  We include 49 two-digit NACE code dummies to capture industry 
characteristics.
28 
The interest rate variables are incorporated to control for the underlying cost of capital in the economy.  We 
control for variations in the cost of capital by including four variables.  The first is the interest rate on a 
Belgian Government Security with the same repayment duration as the loan granted to the firm.  We calculate 
this interest rate using the exact date of granting the loan to the firm.  Secondly, we include a Term Spread, 
defined as the difference between the yield on a Belgian government bond with repayment duration of five 
years and the yield on a 3-months Treasury bill.  Finally, we incorporate two year dummies (1995 is the base 
case) to control for business cycle effects. 
4.  Empirical results 
4.1.  Regression Analysis 
This section provides the empirical results of the determinants of the loan rate.  We analyze the determinants 
of the loan rate by regressing the loan interest rate on our distance, relationship, competition, and control 
variables (which include loan contract characteristics, firm characteristics, and interest rates).  We use the 
ordinary least squares estimation technique.  We focus on the distance, relationship, and competition 
variables.  We first discuss a start-up specification.  Afterwards, we add our competition and distance 
variables of interest, and perform supplementary robustness tests. 
First, we regress the loan interest rate (in basis points) on the relationship characteristics and control 
variables.  This specification merely replicates an exercise by Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) for the 
retained 15,044 observations. Our sample also includes large firms.
29  Most coefficients remain virtually 
unaltered, both as a departure from Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) and throughout the exercises in this 
paper; hence we therefore only briefly discuss, but do not tabulate, the estimated coefficients. 
The loan contract characteristics include whether the loan is collateralized, the repayment duration of the 
loan, and loan type and goal.  The coefficient of Collateral indicates that when a loan is collateralized, the 
loan rate decreases by approximately 51*** basis points.
30  This result seems in line with the sorting-by-
private-information paradigm, which predicts that safer borrowers pledge more collateral (for example, 
Berger and Udell (1990) and Besanko and Thakor (1987)).  However, it contrasts with results by for example 
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Machauer and Weber (1998), who report a positive, though economically 
small, effect of collateralization on loan rates.  The coefficient of ln(Repayment Duration of Loan) is 
significantly negative at a 1-% level: an increase of the duration from five to six years reduces the interest rate 
by 17 basis points.
31 




171.3***) than do single-person businesses (the base case).  Both the Corporations (-116.2***) and the 
Limited Partnerships with Equal Sharing (-46.2*) pay a significantly lower interest rate than single-person 
businesses with unlimited liability for business debts. 
Finally, a significant fraction of the variation in the loan rate is explained by economy-wide factors.  The 
change in the loan rate due to a basis point change in the interest rate on a Government Security with the 
same repayment duration equals 0.5***.  A basis point parallel shift of the Term Spread implies a positive 
0.4*** basis point shift in the loan rate.  The size of the coefficient on the government security variable found 
by Petersen and Rajan (1994) is around 0.3*** whereas the one for the term spread is negative and 
insignificant.  Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) reported a somewhat higher coefficient on their government 
security variable (0.7***), but a somewhat lower term spread coefficient (0.3***). 
4.2.  Relationship Characteristics 
We now report the empirical results concerning the role of relationships.  These variables play a more 
prominent role in our analysis of the impact of distance on loan conditions.  We capture the role of the bank-
firm relationship in two complementary ways.  Our first indicator of relationship strength, Main Bank, 
measures the scope of the bank-firm relationship.  The loan rate is decreasing in the scope of the relationship.  
The results show that a firm pays 41*** basis points less when the scope of a relationship is sufficiently 
broad.
32 
The second indicator is the Duration of the Relationship between the lending bank and the borrower.  We 
take the log of the Duration of the Relationship as we expect the marginal impact on the loan rate to decrease 
in the duration of the financial relationship.  The coefficient is significantly positive, around 19***, implying 
that the loan rate increases in the duration of the relationship, as in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000).  An 
increase in duration from say 7.5 (median) to 13 (median plus one standard deviation) years increases the 
loan rate by around 10 basis points. 
4.3.  Competition 
We incorporate in Models I, II, and III both our measures of banking competition (and the resulting market 
power of the lending bank) and geographical distance.  Table 5 presents the results.  We first discuss the 
competition measures.  In line with the discussed spatial models, we start by employing the Number of bank 
branches of the Competitors operating in the postal zone where the borrower is located.  We add the natural 
log of one plus this number to the regression, and report the results in Model I.  The coefficient on ln(Number 
of Competitors) is not significantly different from zero.  Hence, when competition is measured by the number 
of bank branches present in the same postal zone as the borrower, neither the effects of induced competition 
nor adverse selection effects seem to dominate. 
Next, we add the number of bank branches of competitors in adjacent postal zones to this variable, as the 
delineation of postal zones may not correspond to the relevant geographical clustering of banking activities 
(for example, the capital Brussels covers more than a dozen postal zones).  The coefficient on the adjusted 
variable is not significant either, and we choose not to report the results. 
In Model II, we replace the number of competitors by a more commonly used measure of competition, the 
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI).  We resort to using the number of bank branches of each bank in the 
postal zone to construct market shares.  In effect, we assume coordination occurs between branches of the 
same bank, while our previous measure of competition assumed branch independence.
33  The resulting 
coefficient on the HHI equals a significant, but small, 35.3**.  This estimate implies that an increase of 0.1 in 
the HHI, say from a competitive (HHI < 0.1) to a “highly concentrated” (HHI > 0.18) market,
34 would 
increase the loan rate by only 3.5 basis points. 
The coefficient on the HHI in our regression model corresponds to the (mostly) positive coefficients reported 
by, for example, Berger, Rosen and Udell (2001c), Hannan (1991), Hannan (1997), and Sapienza (2002).  
Appendix A tabulates a few selected studies.  The estimates imply that bank loan rates change between -6 and 
61 basis points corresponding an increase in the HHI by 0.1.  However, it remains hard to compare results 
across specifications, banking markets, periods, and HHI measures.  For example, concentration measures are 
alternatively based on loans, deposits, or branches, and vary widely (across studies) in geographical span.
35 
We introduce postal zone effects in Model III to control better for the geographical variation in competition 
and firm characteristics.  We exclude HHI and the postal area dummies, as these variables are by definition 
spanned by the postal zone effects.  We also drop the industry dummies, as collinearity problems hobble our 
calculations.  A Lagrange multiplier test indicates the effects are significant.  We further test for the 
orthogonality of the random effects and the regressors using a Hausman (1978) test and cannot reject 




coefficients for the random effects model in column III (the results for the fixed effects model are very 
similar).  The coefficients on all variables of interest are virtually unaffected. 
Finally, we replace the postal zone effects by bank branch effects to capture branch specific variation in 
competition and/or spatial variation.  Again, random effects seem preferred and the estimated coefficients are 
very similar.  We choose not to report the results. 
4.4.  Distance 
We now turn to our distance variables of interest.  We take the log of both distance measures, ln(Distance to 
Closest Competitors) and ln(Distance to Lender), as we conjecture the marginal impact on the loan rate to 
decrease (in absolute value) in distance.  We will investigate the impact of this choice of functional form in a 
robustness exercise.  The positive and significant coefficients on ln(Distance to Closest Competitors) in 
Models I, II, and III suggest that borrowers located farther away from competing bank branches face a higher 
loan rate at the lending bank.  These results are consistent with price discrimination resulting from 
transportation costs, monitoring costs, as well as asymmetric information.  Moreover, our proxy for the 
distance between the borrower and the closest competitor may identify strategic behavior between banks, 
which our other competition variables did not (or only partly) pick up.  Indeed, even after controlling for the 
number of competitors, branch concentration, postal zone and bank branch effects, the lending bank seems to 
enjoy substantial market power that increases in the distance to the closest competitors.  In addition, this 
market power decreases in the distance between the borrower and the lender itself, as indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficient on the variable ln(Distance to Lender). 
The location models discussed in section 2 provide precise theoretical predictions concerning the sum of the 
coefficients on both distance measures.  In particular, given the locations of bank branches, a marginal shift in 
the location of the borrower implies that the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures should equal 
zero.  Therefore, in line with this theoretical prediction emanating from simple location models, we restrict 
the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures to equal zero in Model II (which coefficients are mostly 
easily interpretable).  We test the restriction and report the results in Model IV.  The F-statistic equals 8.6 and 
hence we cannot reject the equality restriction. 
Both distance effects are not only statistically but also economically relevant.  Using the estimates of Model 
IV, for example, an increase of one standard deviation in the distance between borrower and lender, i.e., the 
traveling time increasing from 0 to 7.3 minutes, decreases the loan rate by 18 basis points.  An increase of 
one standard deviation in the distance between borrower and the closest competitors (from 0 to 2.3 minutes) 
increases the loan rate by about 10 basis points. 
For the median loan of BEF 300,000, annual outlays for the borrower decrease by BEF 72 (USD 1.8) per 
extra minute of traveling to the lender.
36  Belgian entrepreneurs and (bank) managers made around BEF 20 / 
minute in 1995,
37 while the operating costs for a car (gas, maintenance, tires) may have amounted to around 
BEF 3 / minute of driving.
38  Hence, according to a simple linear transportation cost model the median 
borrower is expected to make one-and-a-half additional round-trips to his bank branch as a direct result of the 
new loan.  Alternatively, according to a linear monitoring cost model, bank managers are expected to make 
three round-trip visits to their median borrowers.  We find these estimates reasonable (given that for example 
loan repayment can be organized by mail) but economically interesting on the margin. 
4.5.  Relationship Characteristics and Distance 
The lending bank in our study does not seem to practice uniform loan pricing.  On the contrary, borrowers 
located closer to the lender and farther away from competitors incur higher loan rates.  We also observe that 
an increase in the distance between borrower and lender decreases the loan rate by a similar amount than a 
decrease in the distance between borrower and the closest competitors. 
Borrower-Lender and borrower-competing bank distances also have implications for the information of banks 
about borrowers.  To investigate whether informational arguments hinge on distance, we interact our two 
distance measures with the bank-firm relationship variables in Model V.  The results are very interesting.  
The distance coefficients (as such) now capture the impact of distance for “transactional borrowers” (Main 
Bank = 0 and Duration = 0).  The restricted coefficients from this regression (which equal minus and plus 
14.2***) suggest that a transactional borrower in our sample expects to visit his branch two-and-a-half times 
per year as a result of a new BEF 300,000 loan (according to a linear transportation model), one time more 
than the median borrower in Model IV. 
Remember that in Hauswald and Marquez (2000), the uninformed (transactional) lenders charge a higher loan 
rate to remote borrowers to compensate for the adverse selection problem which intensifies in the vicinity of 




coefficient on the Distance to Lender variable is significantly negative (this result is independent of the 
equality restriction, which can not be rejected in the first place).  We see three potential interpretations.  First, 
banks in the vicinity of the firm are informed, as in Hauswald and Marquez (2000).  Our results then suggest 
that the magnitude of the adverse selection problem does not increase significantly in distance.  Alternatively, 
no bank in the vicinity of the firm is informed and there is no adverse selection issue.  In other words, the 
loans we observe are transactional “all-around” and the lending bank can infer that no alternative lender in 
the vicinity of the borrower is informed about the borrower either.  Finally, non-main bank firms become 
informed and attracted by the advertisements of lower prices by the lender (Bester and Petrakis (1995)).  All 
three scenarios accommodate a negative correspondence between distance and loan rate. 
Main Bank customers seem shielded from discriminatory loan pricing, as we cannot reject the joint equality 
to zero of the sum of the coefficients on the distance measures and the respective interaction terms with the 
Main Bank variable (F = 0.156).  Remember that a main bank borrower buys at least two products from the 
same bank and has a turnover on the current account at that same bank of at least BEF 100,000 per month.  
Hence, main bank borrowers may face price discrimination on other products and/or be less informed about 
alternative banks, their products, and prices.  However, main bank customers also pay a lower loan rate in our 
sample.  The latter result is not compatible with the main bank borrowers being less informed in a location 
cum information model.  However, the lower loan rate may be caused by cross-subsidization between loans 
and other banking products.  The duration of the relationship between borrower and bank has an insignificant 
effect on the harshness of price discrimination. 
To conclude, broadly in line with theories incorporating asymmetric information, we find that “transactional” 
borrowers pay higher interest rates and seem therefore more affected by spatial price discrimination than less 
informed “relationship” borrowers. 
4.6.  Robustness Checks 
We subject our main results reported in Table 5 to a battery of robustness checks.  First, we revisit our a 
priori choices regarding our distance measures.  We rerun all models employing traveling times in levels 
(rather than logs).  Results are mostly unaffected, though (not surprisingly) the coefficients entail somewhat 
smaller effects.  For example, in Model III the coefficient on ln(Distance to Lender) equals –1.1***, implying 
a decrease in the annual outlays for the median borrower of BEF 33 per extra minute of traveling to the 
lender.  Again, we cannot reject the equality restrictions in either Models IV or V. 
We also replace the Distance to Closest Competitors, i.e. the 25-percentile measure, by the (possibly more 
noisy) Distance to the actual Closest Competitor in all specifications discussed so far.  We report the 
coefficients for the representative Models III, IV, and V in Appendix B with the label “actual”, but do not 
tabulate standard errors to conserve space.  As can be seen from the table, coefficients are unaffected both in 
sign and magnitude, though (not unexpectedly) significance levels are somewhat higher.  We also replace 
traveling time by physical distance in all specifications and again report the three models in Appendix B, 
labeled “physical”.  Remember that based on our calculations physical distance may well be less indicative as 
a measure of transportation costs for entrepreneurs.  Nevertheless, while the coefficients decrease somewhat 
in size (for longer trips physical distance exceeds traveling time in minutes), signs and significance levels are 
broadly unaffected. 
We remain concerned that technological developments and/or the location of competitors determine the 
choice of lender, partly driving our results rather than for example spatial price discrimination.  Hence, we 
add the Starting Year of the Relationship (assuming technology progresses linearly through time) and the 
(national) Number of Branches to all models.  Even though ln(Duration of Relationship) and Starting Year 
are by construction almost interchangeable and highly correlated (-0.91), both coefficients are significant.  
For example in Model IV, the coefficients are respectively 55.4*** and 4.5***.  The coefficient on the 
Number of Branches is insignificant.  However more importantly, the results for the distance coefficients of 
interest in all discussed models remain virtually unaltered.  Combining these results with earlier exploratory 
regressions leads us to conclude that technological developments may not be a major issue when interpreting 
our results. 
Loan size is exogenous in most location models.  Nevertheless, we introduce Loan Size in the specifications 
assuming a sequential decision process setting first loan size followed by loan rate.  We report the results in 
Table 6.  We focus on the equivalent of Model IV in Table 5, as its parsimony and efficiency will be needed 
in subsequent sub sample exercises (the other specifications yield similar results).  The coefficient on Loan 
Size equals –12.3***, indicating that an increase in loan size from the median (BEF 0.30 mln.) to the mean 
(BEF 0.88 mln.) amount decreases the interest rate by 7 basis points.  The other coefficients remain unaltered 




Next, we aim to recognize the possible interdependence between loan size, rate, and distance.  Loan size and 
rate may be determined jointly.  In addition, the impact of distance on the loan rate may decrease in loan size 
(and possible even duration), due to the fixed cost character of the incurred transportation costs.  Rather than 
estimating an ad-hoc system, we opt for stratifying the sample by loan size, with cut-offs set at BEF 0.2 and 2 
mln.  Reduced sample size leads us to suppress loan contract and firm characteristics.  We report all relevant 
coefficients by size category in Table 6.  The coefficients decrease by loan size, but remain significant for the 
two categories containing the smallest and medium sized loans.  We can also not reject the equality restriction 
of the distance coefficients in either one of the size categories.  In addition, though the coefficients decrease, 
the outlays per minute of extra traveling are quite similar.  For example, for the median loan sizes in each 
group (i.e., BEF 109,000; BEF 500,001; and BEF 3,105,000), a minute of extra traveling costs BEF 47, 58, 
and 63 respectively. 
In a similar vein, we drop the Collateral dummy from the specifications and in addition study the sets of 
contracts with and without collateral separately.  Dropping Collateral hardly affects our main results.  To run 
all specifications on the subsets of contracts we drop loan contract and firm characteristics.  Distance 
continues to play a large role in the pricing of the 11,073 contracts without collateral.  For example, the 
distance coefficients in Model IV equal minus and plus 18.5*** respectively.  On the other hand, for the 
3,971 collateralized contracts the distance coefficients drop to -/+ 2.7, with a standard deviation of 2.0 no 
longer significant at conventional levels.  However, we cannot reject the equality restriction.  Though 
borrowers with or without collateral are equally likely to be main bank customers, posting collateral 
seemingly also softens spatial price discrimination. 
We are concerned that firm characteristics such as firm size or legal status may determine distance.  Hence, 
we restrict the sample to sole proprietorships.  We are left with 12,360 observations and report the results in 
the last but one column of Table 6.  The coefficients on all measures of interest remain broadly unaltered.  
We further randomly select one loan per firm (from the original 15,044 observations) to reduce the impact of 
those (possibly larger) firms subscribing to multiple contracts.  Nonetheless, the results for the remaining 
11,222 loans are very similar to the results reported in Table 5. 
Firms located in one of the 149 postal zones bordering other countries (the Netherlands, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and France) may face additional constraints in finding an alternative Belgian bank.  However, 
our results remain also robust to dropping the 1,744 contracts located in those postal zones. 
Next, we match loan contracts to BelFirst, a data set containing yearly balance and profit/loss statements of 
more than 250,000 Belgian corporations.  Conservatively matching on tax identification numbers, we track 
1,058 firms.  Quite a few sole proprietorships seem not to be listed in BelFirst.  Nevertheless, the summary 
statistics of the matched sample are surprisingly similar to the statistics for the entire data set and we choose 
not to tabulate them.  We employ accounting data from the precise year preceding the loan contract.  To 
parsimoniously control for firm risk and funding needs, we insert as explanatory variables firm Assets and the 
ratios of Earnings, Short Term Debt, and Net Trade Credit over Assets.  We find that smaller, less profitable, 
and firms that are more indebted pay a higher loan rate.  The distance coefficients increase in absolute value 
to 25.9**, but are also estimated much less precisely (the standard deviation on the coefficient increases to 
10.3).  Again, we cannot reject the equality restriction on our distance measures at a 5%-level of significance.  
Excluding the four newly introduced variables does not alter the estimated parameters of our other variables.  
We also collect firm age for 896 out of the 1,058 firms.  Adding ln(Firm Age) as a fifth firm variable causes 
the distance coefficients to decrease in absolute value to 17.6* (the standard deviation equals 10.5). 
Finally, we return to the 612 contracts located in postal zones without any identified bank branches.  We add 
these contracts to the sample bringing the number of observations to 15,656.  We calculate the Distance to the 
Lender for each of these additional contracts, but we set their Distance to the Closest Competitors equal to 
zero.  We add a dummy (which equals one for each of the 612 contracts, and zero otherwise) to account for 
the undetermined effect of distance.  We rerun all models.  The coefficient on the dummy in the postal zone 
effects model, for example, equals 39.5*** (with a standard deviation of 13.9).  Hence, borrowers located in 
a postal zone without any competing bank pay on average 40 basis points more than borrowers located in 
contested postal zones.  This coefficient is quite reasonable when interpreted within the confines of a linear 
transportation model.  The average postal zone covers a square of 6 by 6 km, which driving at the average 
speed of 31 km/h would result in 12 minutes traveling time to the Closest Competitors (now located outside 
the postal zone).  According to the estimates gleaned from the original effects model, such distance to the 
Closest Competitor increases the loan rate by 47 basis points. 
5.  Conclusions 




and all other banks in the vicinity of the firm.  We report, as far as we are aware, the first comprehensive 
evidence of the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending.  Loan rates decrease in the 
distance between the firm and the lender and increase similarly in the distance between the firm and 
competing banks.  Both effects are statistically significant and economically relevant.  The results are robust 
to various changes in model specifications and variable definitions and seem not induced by the modest 
changes in lending technology we infer.  The observed stability of the Belgian bank branch system during our 
sample period allows us to interpret the coefficients of the simple reduced form specifications within the 
framework of static models explaining spatial price discrimination. 
Loan rates may reflect both distance as well as information effects.  Loan rates decrease more in lender-firm 
distance for transactional (single-product) and un-collateralized loans.  As borrowers engage the lending bank 
more broadly or post collateral, spatial price discrimination seems to relax.  We find no direct evidence of 
adverse selection increasing in geographical distance, though it is possible that most borrowers we classify as 
transactional are unknown to all banks in the vicinity. 
Overall, our results suggest that local loan officers may price loans by location, though distance variables are 
not featured explicitly in their formally acknowledged credit scoring system.  However, granting some 
autonomy to local loan officers in assessing and pricing local loan applications may be optimal (Stein 
(2002)).  Including qualitative, “soft factors” in the scoring system provides the loan officers with the 
necessary discretion.  Brunner, Krahnen and Weber (2000), for example, provide preliminary empirical 
evidence (for Germany) of the importance of qualitative factors in setting loan rates (through internal bank 
ratings).  We suspect that the loan officers, employed at the bank we study, wield soft factors to practice price 
discrimination based on their location and the presence of alternative providers of financing in the vicinity of 
the firm. 
If banks persist in pricing loans by location, brick-and-mortar branching may remain vital in ensuring access 
to credit at reasonable rates, in particular for small firms and entrepreneurs.  While technological 
developments in communication and travel may ultimately diminish the relevance of distance, we find only 
minor traces of such developments in our sample (which envelops the 1975-1997 period).  The latter result 
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TABLE 1.  THEORETICAL MODELS LINKING LOAN RATES AND DISTANCE 
    Impact on the Loan Rate of the   
Arguments & Discussed Models  Distance to the Lender
*  Distance to the Closest Competitor
*  Number of Competitors 
     
Transportation Costs     
Uniform Pricing  no  no  negative 
Discriminatory  Pricing  negative positive negative 
     
Monitoring Costs & Discriminatory Pricing     
Sussman and Zeira (1995)  negative  positive  negative 
Wong and Chan (1993)  non-monotonic  non-monotonic  negative 
     
     
  Distance to the Relationship Bank
*  Distance to the Transactional Bank
*  Number of Competitors 
     
Asymmetric Information     
Broecker (1990), Cao and Shi (2001)  -  -  positive 
Dell'Ariccia (2001)  negative  no  negative 
Hauswald and Marquez (2000)  negative  positive  positive / negative 
     
Notes: 
* For a given number of competitors. TABLE 2.  BANK AND POSTAL ZONE STATISTICS 
         
Total Number of Banks  145       
Total Number of Bank Branches  7,477       
  Postal Zones  Postal Areas       
         
Total  Number  837  9     
Average Surface Area, in sq km  36  3,359       
Average  Population  12,045  1,120,209     
  Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std. Dev. 
         
Number of Banks per Postal Zone  8.9 6  1  103  10.4 
Number of Adjacent Postal Zones / Postal Zone  5.1 5  0  16  2.0 
Number of Banks in Adjacent Postal Zones  53.6 44  2  471  42.4 
Sources:  Belgian Bankers’ Association, Bankvestigingen in Belgie, 1995, CIA Factbook 1995, and Geocart, Administratieve Kaart van Belgie en Groot-Hertogdom 
Luxembourg, 1992. TABLE 3.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
Variables Definition  Mean  Median  Min  Max  St.dev. 
            
Distance             
Distance to Lender  Shortest traveling time, in minutes  6.90  4.29  0.00  51.00  7.30 
Distance to Closest Competitors  Shortest traveling time to the closest quartile competitor in the 
borrower’s postal zone, in minutes 
3.82 3.27  0.00  24.00  2.33 
            
Relationship Characteristics            
Main Bank  = 1 if bank considers itself as main bank
a  0.59 1  0 1  0.49 
Duration of Relationship  Length of relationship with current lender, in years  7.93  7.47  0.00  26.39  5.44 
            
Competition            
Number of Competitors  Number of branches (minus the lender’s) in the borrower’s postal zone  17.18  13  1  103  15.49 
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index  Summed squares of bank market shares, by number of branches, in each 
postal zone 
0.17 0.15  0.05  1.00  0.11 
            
Loan Rate and Size            
Loan Rate  Interest rate on loan until next revision, in basis points  812  782  200  2,200  236 
Loan Size  Size of loan, in millions of BEF
c  0.88 0.30  0.005  80 1.83 






Loan Contract Characteristics            
Collateral  = 1 if loan is secured via collateral  0.26  0  0  1  0.44 
Repayment Duration of Loan  Repayment duration of loan, in years  2.35  0.55  0.00  20.00  3.26 
Business Mortgage   = 1 if loan is a business mortgage loan  n/a
b        
Bridging Finance  = 1 if loan is a bridging finance loan  n/a
b       
Prepay Taxes  = 1 if loan is credit to prepay taxes  n/a
b       
Business Term  = 1 if loan is a business term loan (investment credit)  n/a
b       
Consumer Credit   = 1 if loan is a consumer credit loan (capturing installment loans)  n/a
b       
Rollover  = 1 if loan is given to prepay another loan  0.10  0  0  1  0.30 
            
Firm Characteristics            
Small Firm  = 1 if < 10 employees and turnover < BEF 250 mln.
c  0.16 0  0 1  0.37 
Medium Firm  = 1 if > 10 employees or turnover > BEF 250 mln.
c 0.01  0  0  1  0.09 
Large Firm  = 1 if turnover > BEF 1 bln.
c 0.00  0  0  1  0.04 
Limited Partnership  = 1 if firm is limited partnership  0.12  0  0  1  0.32 
Limited Partnership w/ ES  = 1 if firm is limited partnership with equal sharing  0.01  0  0  1  0.11 
Corporation  = 1 if firm is corporation  0.04  0  0  1  0.19 
Bridge Arrangements  = 1 if firm is a temporary, bridge arrangement  0.00  0  0  1  0.01 
            
Interest Rate Variables             
Government Security  Interest rate on a Belgian government security with equal repayment 
duration as loan to firm, in basis points 
389 350  305  805  87 
Term Spread  Yield on Belgian government bond of 5-years - yield on treasury bill 
with maturity of 3-months, in basis points 
179 177  100  268  31 
            
Notes.  The number of observations is 15,044.  
a The definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main bank is: for single person businesses and small firms, 
have a ‘turnover’ on the current account of at least BEF 100,000 per month and buy at least two products from that bank.  
b For bank-strategic considerations, we cannot 
reveal the relative importance of the types of loans.  
c 40 Belgian Francs (BEF) are approximately equal to 1 US$. TABLE 4.  CORRELATION TABLE 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
         
Distance to Lender  (1)  1  0.184***  -0.033***  -0.122***  -0.072*** 
Distance to Closest Competitors  (2)    1  0.013  0.013*  0.146*** 
Main Bank  (3)      1  0.218***  0.010 
Duration of Relationship  (4)        1  -0.005 
Number  of  Competitors  (5)       1 
         
Source: The number of observations is 15,044.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, using Pearson-correlation. TABLE 5.  BORROWING COSTS AND THE ROLE OF DISTANCE 
     Models    
Independent Variables  I  II  III  IV  V 
       
Distance       




















       
Relationship Variables       




















Main Bank x 
ln(Distance to Lender) 
     11.1** 
(4.6) 
Main Bank x 
ln(Distance to Closest Competitors) 
     -11.1** 
(4.6) 
ln(Duration of Relationship) x 
ln(Distance to Lender) 
     -0.1 
(2.7) 
ln(Duration of Relationship) x  
ln(Distance to Closest Competitors) 
     0.1 
(2.7) 
       
Competition       
ln(Number of Competitors)  -0.4 
(2.6) 
    






Postal Zone Random Effects      Yes
d    









e Yes Yes 
       
Equality Restriction(s), F-statistic        8.645  3.597 
Adjusted R
2  0.227 0.223 0.143 0.222 0.222 
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points.  The number of 
observations is 15,044.  We employ ordinary least squares estimation.  *, **, and *** = significant at 
10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3.  Ln(.) are the 
natural log of one plus the respective variables.  Including:  
a four loan revisability dummies, 
b eight postal 
area and 49 industry dummies, and 
c two year dummies.  
d Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No 
Effects = 390.1***, and Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 35.0.  
e Excluding: postal 




Size    By Loan Size (LS),  





    LS£0.2 0.2<LS£ 2  2<LS 
 
Loan Size  -12.3*** 
(1.1) 
       
Distance            


























Relationship Variables            


























            
Competition            














Firm Characteristics            
Assets
a           -0.4*** 
(0.1) 
Earnings / Assets            -67.0* 
(40.3) 
Short Term Debt / 
Assets 
         88.0** 
(42.2) 
Net Trade Credit / 
Assets 
         -48.0 
(44.2) 
Loan Contract












and Intercept Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Obs.  15,044  5,850  7,344  1,850  12,360  1,058 
Equality Restriction, F  9.022  3.268  4.616  1.717  11.510  2.736* 
Adjusted R
2  0.228 0.011  0.136  0.665  0.210  0.098 
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points.  We employ ordinary 
least squares estimation.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  The definition 
of the variables can be found in Table 3.  Ln(.) are the natural log of one plus the respective variables.  
a In 
millions of BEF .  Including:  
b four loan revisability dummies, 
c eight postal area and 49 industry 
dummies, and 
d two year dummies.  
e Excluding all variables but the eight postal area and 49 industry 
dummies.APPENDIX A.  EMPIRICAL WORK INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF BANK MARKET CONCENTRATION ON BANK LOAN CONDITIONS. 
Papers 
Data Source 
# Observations in Regressions 
Observation Type 
Concentration in Markets 
Geographical span: Avg. Pop. / Area 
Average HHI 
Loan Rate Measure 
The Impact of Concentration on the Loan Rate 
Impact of DHHI = 0.1, In Basis Points 








-6 to 61*** 
Berger et al. (2001c)  NSSBF 1993 
520 




credit line rate – prime rate 
Mostly Positive 
7 to 14* 







loan rate – prime rate 
Positive 
59*** 
Kim, Kristiansen and 
Vale (2001) 
Central Bank of Norway 
1,241 
Norwegian firms 





















Notes.  The measure of concentration in all studies is the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI), which can be calculated by squaring the market share of each bank 
competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers (0 < HHI < 1).  NSSBF is the National Survey of Small Business Finance.  STB is the Federal Reserve’s 
Survey of the Terms of Bank lending to business.  
a Our calculations.  
b For HHI increasing from 0.1 to 0.2.  
 c Coefficients in regressions for short term loans in their 
models 3, 5, and 6.  
d Their models 2 and 5.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. APPENDIX B.  THE ACTUAL CLOSEST COMPETITOR AND PHYSICAL DISTANCE 
      Models    
Independent Variables  II-actual  III-actual  IV-actual  II-physical  III-physical  IV-physical 
         
ln(Distance to Lender)  -5.3**  -10.5***  -8.6***  -3.5*  -7.9***  -4.7** 
ln(Distance to Closest Competitors)  16.7***  18.0***  8.6***  10.4***  14.7***  4.7** 
         
Main  Bank  -41.2*** -53.2*** -41.0*** -41.0*** -53.0***  -40.9*** 
ln(Duration of Relationship)  18.9***  24.1***  18.6***  18.9***  24.0***  18.8*** 
         
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index  24.1    32.2**  31.3**    33.5** 
Postal Zone Random Effects    Yes
d     Yes
e  




c Intercept  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
 
         
Equality Restriction, F- statistic      9.338      3.385 
Adjusted R
2  0.223 0.143 0.222 0.222 0.142  0.222 
         
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in %.  The number of observations is 15044.  We employ ordinary least squares estimation.  *, **, and 
*** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed. In Models labeled "actual", the Distance to the actual (not 25%) Closest Competitor is used.  In Models "physical", 
the fastest physical distance (not traveling time) is used.  The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 3.  Ln(.) are the natural log of one plus the respective 
variables.  Including: 
a four loan revisability dummies, 
b eight postal area and 49 industry dummies, and 
c two year dummies.  
d Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus 
No Effects = 392.23***.  Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 35.17.  
e Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 394.25***.  Hausman 
(1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 35.19. NOTES 
 
1 See for example Kilkenny and Thisse (1999) and Chapter 7 in Tirole (1988) for a review. 
2 An increase in the number of banks also decreases the loan rate in more general models of imperfect 
Cournot competition between a finite number of banks.  See for example, the rendition of the Monti 
(1972)-Klein (1971) model in Freixas and Rochet (1997)(pp. 57-60). 
3 In Boot and Thakor (1999), more interbank competition encourages banks to step up relationship 
lending but also to diminish sector specialization. 
4 For example, Degryse (1996) and Irmen and Thisse (1998) model bank product placement decisions in 
multi-dimensional product spaces. 
5 Independents or single-person businesses are natural persons who run a small business in which they are 
employed themselves.  They have no limited liability and are comparable to sole proprietorships. 
6 The bank argues that loans starting earlier than 1995 have been prepaid.  We have a dummy variable 
Rollover in all empirical specifications, capturing whether the new loan served to prepay an old loan. 
7 The Annual Report of the Belgian Bankers Association reports 7,668 branches.  We consolidate multiple 
branches of the same bank at the same address. 
8 Belgium covers 30,230 sq km in land surface. 
9 Such as the shortest, but not necessarily fastest, driving distance or the shortest distance-as-the-crow-
flies. 
10 For example, a small-town bank branch is listed as underwriting a dozen contracts located around the 
country.  We suspect an address-recording error in the dataset we received.  Unfortunately, we cannot ask 
the bank to check such entries. 
11 For example, serious misspelling of street names invariably leads the mapping software to “overshoot” 
the correct distance.  We track and fix most (but possibly not all) such mapping problems. 
12 For example, some borrowers reside in a ritzy beach resort, often more than an hour drive from their 
respective lenders in various locations inland, most likely to lower their community taxes. 
13 We are left with 11,222 different borrowers in the sample.  We report only the statistics for the set of all 
contracts, as the borrower-based statistics are very similar. 
14 The sample is highly representative in this regard.  The average speed of travel in Belgium across all 
modes of transportation was 31.1 km/h in 1998 according to a National Survey of Mobility (source: 
Belgian National Institute of Statistics, http://www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d37_nl.htm#1).  Traveling time 
and driving distance are highly correlated.  For example, the correlation coefficient for the 15,044 
borrower-lender pairs is 0.96. 
15 For example, Cole and Wolken (1995), Table 1. 
16 Petersen and Rajan (2002) document that firm size is positively correlated with distance (their Table III, 
column VI).  However, the effect seems rather limited for smaller firm sizes. 
17 Belgian gasoline prices at the pump are typically more than double the prices in the US, mainly because 
of taxation.  For example, in the last week of September 2001 regular gasoline at the pump went for 1.48 
USD/gallon in the US and 3.11 USD/gallon in Belgium (Energy Info Administration and Belgian 
Petroleum Federation). 
18 The US land surface measures 9,158,960 sq km, making the US 303 times larger than Belgium (CIA 
Factbook 2000). 
19 For example, Berger et al. (2001b) note that reweighing the NSSBF to make the survey nationally 
representative (because the NSSBF under-samples the very smallest firms) decreases the average distance 
in their sample from 26.1 to 11.8 miles (their Footnote 15). 
20 See also Cyrnak and Hannan (2001). 
21 We also analyze the postal codes for all 17,776 contracts.  The percentage firms located in another 
postal zone (area) than the lender increased from 35% (2%) prior to 1981 to 47% (7%), after 1993.  If we 
assume a conservatively long average traveling distance of 3 (30) km within a postal zone (area) and 87.5 
km across postal areas (i.e., half the square root of the surface of each respective region), average 
distances increased by around 45%.  Hence, our mapping technology and screening procedures seem not 
to have biased our results across time. 
22 Source: Annual Reports of the Belgian Bankers’ Association.  For years prior to 1991, we imputed the 
number of bank branches using growth rates in the numbers of commercial bank branches only.  Ideally, 
we would like to break out the numbers for the individual bank we study. 






24 A study by Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) also seems to suggest that physical proximity continues to play 
a role in European bank loan markets, but not in European time deposit or mortgage markets. 
25 In less densely branched areas proximity may play a more prominent role.  For example, regressing 
Distance to Lender on Distance to Closest Competitors yields a slope coefficient of 0.57*** and an 
intercept equaling 4.69***.  These estimates suggest a crossover point of around 11 minutes at which the 
Distance to the Lender on average becomes smaller than the Distance to the quartile Closest Competitor.  
Less than 1% of all borrowers in our sample are located in such areas. 
26 We use Belgian Francs (BEF) throughout the paper but indicate equivalent amounts in U.S. Dollar 
(USD).  Belgium switched to the Euro on January 1
st, 1999. 
27 A possible effect of MAIN is that the bargaining power of a firm increases, as it also buys other 
products at that bank.  In other words, cross-subsidization could negatively influence the loan rate. 
28 The NACE code is the European industrial classification system subdividing industries. 
29 Their Table 2, Model 2.  Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) drop large firms and study 17,429 
observations, while Degryse and Van Cayseele (1998) report results for all 17,776 observations. 
30 As in all Tables, *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level (two-tailed). 
31 As indicated in the Tables, we always take the log of “one plus” the indicated variables. 
32 For a detailed discussion of these results and the related theoretical and empirical literature, see Boot 
(2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000). 
33 An intermediate measure would count the number of different banks in each postal zone.  This measure 
seems a-priori less informative than using the market shares. 
34 The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (April 
1997) label markets with an HHI above 0.18 ‘highly concentrated’. 
35 See for example, Hannan and Strahan (2000), Morgan (2002), and Radecki (1998). 
36 All calculations are averaged over the zero to one standard deviation interval. 
37 The gross monthly wage of Belgian entrepreneurs and managers was 153,416 BEF and full-time 
employees worked 1,543 hours on average per year (source: Belgian National Institute of Statistics, 
http://www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d321_nl.htm). 
38 Including 1.8 BEF / minute for gas (at a speed of 31 km / h in a car using 10 liters of gasoline / 100 km 
and a pump price of 35 BEF / liter) and 1.20 BEF / minute for maintenance and tires (source: Belgian 
Petroleum Federation and AAA “Your Driving Costs”). 
39 “The Death of Distance” is the title of a book by Frances Cairncross.  Its second edition is published by 
Harvard Business School Press.  See also http://www.deathofdistance.com/. 